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Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps1
In the case of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,2 the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the United
States Constitution3 requires a private-figure4 plaintiff suing for a defamatory5
1. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
2. Id.
3. The first amendment of the United States Constitution has been the vehicle by
which former standards of recovery for the defamation plaintiff have been driven to
their demise. The freedom of speech and press guaranteed in the first amendment is the
most often cited reason for restricting the common law recovery standards. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
4. The United States Supreme Court's decisions center on three categories of
plaintiffs. The first category is the "public official." Public official status applies "at the
very least" to a government employee who has, or in the eyes of the public has, sub-
stantial responsibility in the conduct of public affairs, and in whose qualifications the
public has more than a general interest. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966).
The second category is the "public figure." Two types of public figures exist. First, a
person may be a public figure because he has achieved such a significant role in the
resolution of important issues so as to make his discreditable conduct and characteris-
tics true matters of public interest. Second, a person can become a public figure by
injecting himself into issues or controversies of importance to the general public. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1973).
The third category is that of the "private figure." The private figure has not ac-
cepted public office or assumed an influential role in ordered society. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345. In short, the private figure is the antithesis of the public figure and public official,
failing the test for both.
5. A defamatory statement is one that tends to disparage reputation. W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971). A defamatory statement
diminishes the "esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or
excites adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." Id. § 111,
at 739.
However, not all statements which disparage reputation are actionable. To be ac-
tionable, the statement at issue must be false. Indeed, the truth of a defamatory state-
ment is an absolute defense. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 116, at 840 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter THE LAW OF TORTS]. Furthermore,
the statement must be "published"; that is, it must be communicated to one or more
people. W. PROSSER, supra, § 113, at 766. The defamatory meaning of the statement
must be understood by the person to which the statement was published and it must be
understood as applying to the plaintiff. Id. § 113, at 767. Finally, the plaintiff must not
have consented to the statements and the statements must not be privileged.
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statement of public concern to prove the falsity of that statement. In a five to
four decision authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Powell and Blackmun, the Court held that the Constitution does re-
quire a private figure plaintiff to prove falsity. The decision overruled the com-
mon law of several states, which assumed that a person's reputation was a
good one and thus presumed that defamatory statements were false6 unless
proven true by the publisher.7 By forcing the private individual to prove that a
challenged statement is false, Hepps will accordingly increase the prima facie
requirements to recover for defamation in many jurisdictions.
The purpose of this Note is threefold. First, the background and develop-
ment of defamation law will be presented with a focus on its treatment of the
private individual. Second, it will postulate the state of defamation law at the
time Hepps was argued. The focus of this analysis will be on the balance the
Supreme Court had struck, both in the law and in reality, between the private
individual's right to vindicate his good name and the media's first amendment
rights. Finally, Hepps will be analyzed with an eye towards evaluating the
propriety of the decision in light of the court's reasoning, policy, and its proba-
ble effect on the private figure defamation plaintiff.
The right of the private individual to protect his reputation from harm
can be traced to the earliest vestiges of organized society.' In the early 10th
century, the Germanic people developed an elaborate compensation schedule
for private individuals who had been insulted.9 In England, an individual's rep-
As a matter of constitutional law, the public official/public figure must prove that
the statement was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its
truth. If the statement concerns a private figure, the statement must have been pub-
lished with lack of reasonable care as to the statement's truth or falsity. Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Elliot v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Trahan
v. Ritterman, 368 So. 2d 181, 184 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Parsons v. Gulf & South Am.
Steamship Co., 194 So. 2d 456, 460 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967);
Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 61, 589 P.2d 126, 129-30 (1978), cert. denied sub
nom. Williams v. Pasma, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152
N.J. Super. 133, 146-47, 377 A.2d 807, 814 (1977), modified, 164 N.J. Super. 465,
397 A.2d 334 (1979); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 87, 94 (Okla.
1976); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 447-51, 468, 273 A.2d 899, 907-
09, 917 (1971); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn.
1978); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 623-25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 654-55, 318
N.W.2d 141, 150, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
7. Truth is an absolute defense to an action sounding in defamation. The defense
that the defamatory statement is true has been given the technical name of justifica-
tion. THE LAW OF ToRTs, supra note 5, § 116, at 840.
8. Veeder, The History of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REV. 546, 548-
49 (1903).
9. The Lex Salica, an early compilation of written law, was very concerned with
the use of foul language. If one were to call a man a "wolf" or a "hare" one would
have to pay three shillings. If one were to insult the chastity of a woman the penalty
was forty-five shillings. Id. at 548.
[Vol. 53
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utation was protected in both the secular and the ecclesiastical courts. Injuries
to reputation were punishable by the payment of money damages in the for-
mer courts and as a sin in the latter.10 These early rights of an individual to
protect his reputation crossed the Atlantic intact and eventually developed into
the common law tort of defamation.
At common law, defamation was a strict liability tort." An individual
could recover for damage to his reputation caused by a defamatory falsehood
absent any showing that the publisher knew of the statement's falsity, or that
the publisher was careless in investigating the statement's veracity.1 2 Indeed,
prior to 1964, the United States Supreme Court endorsed this standard of
recovery for defamed plaintiffs by holding that state laws proscribing this re-
covery were consistent with the first amendment's guarantees of freedom of
speech and press.1 3
However, the development of the electronic media fashioned an impend-
ing clash between the liberal recovery standards in the state common law and
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press. The first curtail-
ment of the individual's right to recover in strict liability occurred in the
United States Supreme Court's decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.14
In Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit
against the New York Times, claiming he had been libeled in a two-page ad-
vertisement that had been run by various civil rights leaders. While Sullivan
was not actually mentioned by name in the ad, he recovered $500,000 under
an Alabama law which inferred that libelous statements made about a govern-
10. King Alfred, who presided over the secular courts, provided that a slanderer
should have his tongue cut out unless he could redeem it for the price of his head. The
records of the pleadings in these cases reveal the sensitivity that surrounded the dis-
grace and dishonor the slandered plaintiff felt. The complaints not only allege damages
for the physical injury but also list extra shillings to compensate them for the injury to
reputation. Id. at 549-51.
In the ecclesiastical courts, injury to another's reputation was punishable as a sin.
Insulting language was given the title "di fimmation" and was punished by the penance
of acknowledging the baselessness of the imputation in the presence of the clergy man
and the clergy wards. Additionally, an apology to the person defamed was required. Id.
11. THE LAW OF ToRTs, supra note 5, § 113, at 804; L. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 5, at 14-15 (1978).
12. "[T]he effect of this strict liability is to place the printed, written or spoken
word in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals."
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 113, at 773.
13. Prior to 1964, The Supreme Court had held that certain classes of speech
were undeserving of constitutional protection. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), the Court held that the first amendment protections are not absolute.
Categories of speech, including defamation, which inflict injury by their very utterance
or tend to incite breaches of the peace, could be constitutionally restricted and pun-
ished. Id. at 571-72; accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952). Ac-
cordingly, the state law of libel that punished the press for its abuses of liberty were
not prohibited by either the federal or state constitutions. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 715 (1931).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19881
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ment agency were attributable to the official in charge of that agency.1" At the
time the advertisements were published, Sullivan was the official in charge of
the Montgomery Police Department - an agency targeted by the ads.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments require that a public official must show that the statement was pub-
lished with "actual malice" before the official can recover for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct.16 Further, the Court stated that the
proof must be made with "convincing clarity. ' 17 The Court found that the
New York Times action could at best support a finding of negligence, and
accordingly reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in favor of Sulli-
van.18 While Sullivan created a gap in the previous standard of recovery for
defamatory falsehoods, it left the rights of private figures relatively intact."
The Court's decision centered on public officials and the need for public de-
bate regarding their conduct. The need for this debate justified supplanting the
favorable recovery doctrines previously enjoyed by public officials with an ap-
proach that more equally balanced the needs of the first amendment and the
public official.20 The question of determining the appropriate standard of re-
covery for private individuals was not before the Court. Accordingly, the pri-
vate figure continued to enjoy recovery in strict liability for defamatory
falsehoods. 1
15. In affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Sullivan, the Supreme
Court of Alabama found that the statements had been made of and concerning the
plaintiff. The court stated, "[We] think it common knowledge that the average person
knows that municipal agents ... are under the control and direction of the city gov-
erning body, and more particularly under the direction and control of a single commis-
sioner." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 674-75, 144 So. 2d 25, 39
(1962).
16. The Court defined "actual malice" as the publishing of a statement with
actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or
not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
17. Id. at 285-86.
18. Id. at 288, 292.
19. The Court's holding was specifically narrowed to include the public official
who had been criticized about his public conduct. Id. at 256.
20. The Court made repeated reference to the national commitment to robust,
uninhibited and wide-open debate on matters of official conduct. Id. at 270. The Court
equated the public man with public property, stating that any discussion of them "can-
not be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." Id. at
268.
21. While the Supreme Court did not expressly regulate private figures, it ex-
panded the Sullivan standard to those plaintiffs who were public figures. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text. These new "public figures" were merely private figures
that were either in positions of notoriety or had injected themselves into the public eye
for a specific controversy.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, both reported
at 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Supreme Court decided two consolidated cases on the
"public figure" theory. The two plaintiffs were Wally Butts, former football coach at
the University of Georgia, and Major General Edwin H. Walker, a retired army officer
and participant in political affairs. The Court found that both men were public figures.
[Vol. 53
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The private figure plaintiff remained unaffected by these new constitu-
tional limitations until the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc.22 In Rosenbloom, the Court held that its previous standards for
recovery, based on the private figure/public figure dichotomy, were inade-
quate. The plurality of Justices found that a "public issue" test would best
serve the needs of the first amendment, and would allow an adequate measure
of recovery for the private individual whose good name had been injured.2 3
The test was relatively simple. If a statement by a media defendant centered
on a matter of "public concern," the plaintiff, whether private or public figure,
could not recover absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its
truth.24 The private figure was thus denied strict liability protection against
defamatory falsehoods in those situations where the statement at issue was one
of "public interest."
The Rosenbloom decision quickly came under fire for two reasons. First,
it required judges to make subjective determinations about which plaintiffs
had thrust themselves into the public eye; i.e. was the statement of public
concern. 25 Second, it seemingly ignored the previous commitments to private
figures and their need for protection from defamatory falsehoods .2  These
drawbacks led to Rosenbloom's downfall just three years after its inception.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court repudiated the Ro-
senbloom "public interest" test.2 8 The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who
The Court held that Butts was a public figure because of his position in college athlet-
ics and Walker because he had thrust himself into the public eye. The Court then held
that a public figure could only recover for a defamatory falsehood upon proof of
"higaly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure" from accepted jour-
nalism practices. Id. at 155. While the language of Butts seems to be a departure from
the Sullivan standard of liability in that it does not mention actual malice or reckless
disregard, it has been interpreted to extend the Sullivan standard of culpability to
"public figures." See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 156 (1979); Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335-36 (1974).
22. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
23. The Court explained that once a matter is of "public concern" it cannot then
become less so because a private figure is involved. The public interest is on the event,
not the participants' prior notoriety or anonymity. Id. at 43.
24. Id. at 52.
25. The court in Gertz determined that the Rosenbloom "public interest" test
abridged the legitimate state interest in protecting its citizens' reputations to a degree
it found unacceptable. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
26. The Court in Gertz found that the Rosenbloom opinion failed to take into
account several distinguishing factors that separate the private and public figure. First,
the private figure has relinquished no part of his good name like the public figure or
official. Therefore, he is more deserving of recovery. Id. at 345. Second, the private
figure does not have equal access to media channels. This prevents the private figure
from attaining the same potential latitude that the public figure or official has in rebut-
ting the defamatory statements. Id. at 344.
27. 418 U.S. 323 (1976).
28. Id. at 346.
19881
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had been accused of being a Communist by a publication issued by the John
Birch Society.29 The Court needed an approach that would strike the proper
balance between the strong interest in protecting private individuals' reputa-
tions and the need to shield the press from the "chilling effect" of strict liabil-
ity.30 The Court accomplished this in two ways. First, the Court protected the
state interest in the reputations of its citizens by deferring to the state's judg-
ment as to the level of culpability needed for recovery as long as it was not
strict liability.3' Second, finding that damages in excess of injury serve no state
interest, the Court limited the awarding of presumed and punitive damages to
situations where liability was based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard of the truth.33 By requiring a defamation plaintiff to prove at least negli-
gence and by limiting the award of presumed and punitive damages, the court
substantially lessened any "chilling effect" which previously existed.
After Gertz, the private individual enjoyed a greater measure of protec-
tion against defamatory falsehoods than was afforded the individual under Ro-
senbloom. This was true in most jurisdictions because the plaintiff needed only
to establish the publisher's negligence rather than the "knowledge or reckless
disregard" standard of Rosenbloom.33 However, it must be remembered that
29. The article in question was published in AMERICAN OPINION, the monthly
publication of the John Birch Society. In March, 1960, the defendant published a series
of articles about a prominent Chicago lawyer named Elmer Gertz. Id. at 325. The
articles alleged that Gertz was an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial De-
mocracy ... which has advocated the violent seizure of our government." Further, the
articles labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter." Id. at 326. The article,
and its charges against Gertz, contained serious inaccuracies as to his membership in
organizations and his political beliefs. Id.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 347.
32. Id. at 349.
33. It appears as though the Supreme Court has afforded the private individual
greater deference in his quest to vindicate his good name in its decisions following
Gertz. The Court has accomplished this by manipulating the private/public figure di-
chotomy to place an increasing number of plaintiffs in the private figure category.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court held that the ex-wife of
Russell Firestone was not a public figure despite Time's contention that her position in
society had made her a "cause c6l~bre." Id. at 454. The Court found that even though
she was involved in litigation, it was compulsory litigation in that the litigation was
required to obtain a divorce. The Court seems to have held that while litigation may
create a "public figure" for the limited purpose of that litigation, other plaintiffs, such
as Mrs. Firestone, will remain private figures. Id. at 457.
A similar result was reached in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979). In Wolston, the Court held that the plaintiff was not a "public figure" simply
because he had participated in an investigation of Soviet intelligence agents sixteen
years previous to being defamed. Id. at 165-69. The Court took the position that where
a plaintiff has done nothing to enter a controversy, or does not initiate the press cover-
age of the event he is involved in, he will not lose his private figure status regardless of
the newsworthiness of the event. This position reaffirms the stance the Court took in
Gertz, in repudiating any test centering on the "public interest" of the matter. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
[Vol. 53
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the individual's right to recover in strict liability was forced to yield to the first
amendment rights of the media. One argument advanced to justify the impair-
ment of individual rights in the interest of the first amendment is that the first
amendment rights of the media are textual, while the private figure's reputa-
tion interest is a creature of the common law. The argument asserts that when
textual rights meet common law rights, the common law must yield.', How-
ever, this argument ignores the fact that an individual's reputation has long
been afforded constitutional protection.
The fact that personal reputation is an interest which is afforded constitu-
tional protection is evident from the line of cases beginning with Joint Anti
Fascist Refuge Committee v. McGrath.3 5 In McGrath, the plaintiff sought an
action to enjoin the Attorney General of the United States from labelling vari-
ous organizations as "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive," without
due process of law required under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution. The injuries alleged included loss of contributions, shame and
disgrace.3 6 Although a plurality opinion that never specifically cited the inter-
est that had been violated, McGrath can be interpreted as prohibiting govern-
ment actions which tend to stigmatize or injure absent a showing of adequate
due process protection.3
A more precise definition of the constitutional interest in one's reputation
was outlined in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.8 In Constantineau, a Wisconsin
statute provided that government officials could prohibit the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors to those who were known to indulge to excess.3 9 This was accom-
34. This was an argument advanced by Philadelphia Newspapers and several of
the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Philadelphia Newspapers. Surkin, The Sta-
tus of the Private Figure's Right to Protect His Reputation Under the United States
Constitution, 90 DICK. L. REV. 667, 668 (1986). The recurring theme of those briefs
was that the textual first amendment rights of the media should always prevail over the
private figure's right to protect himself from defamatory falsehoods. As Philadelphia
Newspapers argued in its brief:
Once the publisher's First Amendment rights are injected into the equation,
the common law treatment of the burden of proving truth or falsity cannot
stand. The balance tips in favor of the defendant, whose free speech interests
are strong and protected by the Constitution, rather than in favor of the
Plaintiff, whose interest in his own reputation is strong, but does not reach
constitutional proportions.
Id.
35. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
36. Id. at 131.
37. The Court never expressly mentioned that this case involved a "liberty inter-
est" under the due process clause. Instead, the Court decided the issue on whether the
Attorney General had exceeded his power granted under an executive order. Id. at 140.
The Court found the Attorney General had exceeded his power due to the fact that he
had blacklisted the organization as communist without any articulable justification. Id.
at 126.
38. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
39. Id. at 434 n.2 (referring to Wis. STAT. § 176.26 (1967)).
1988]
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plished by posting notices and names of the persons known to so indulge.40 The
issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the posting of those names,
and the resulting stigma associated with it, was proper absent adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard. The Court held that "[w]here a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake .... notice and an opportunity
to be heard are essential." '4 1 Accordingly, since the Court held that a person's
good name deserves procedural protection under the due process clause, it
must constitute a liberty or property interest under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.42
The constitutional protection afforded an individual's reputation was reaf-
firmed in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.43 In Roth, the issue was
whether a nontenured professor, dismissed without justification from a state
university, had been denied the protection of the due process clause.4 ' The
Court's first inquiry was whether Roth had been deprived of a valid liberty
interest. The Court held that he had not, but, by way of example the Court
outlined what would constitute such an interest.
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and association in the
community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for
example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so,
this would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.""'
Roth can be interpreted as affirming the proposition that an individual's repu-
tation is a liberty or property interest under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments' due process clauses.
Three years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated
in Roth when it decided Goss v. Lopez." In Lopez, several public high school
students were expelled from school without a pre-expulsion hearing.47 The Su-
preme Court found that expulsion from school could damage a student's repu-
tation in the community.4 8 Applying the reasoning outlined in Roth, the Court
found a liberty interest in the students' reputations that qualified for protec-
40. Id. at 435.
41. Id. at 437. The Court cited McGrath to support the premise that before a
condemned person suffers any loss, the right to be heard is essential in our society. See
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Court then drew the
obvious analogy to an individual's reputation to justify its decision.
42. As the Court stated, "Where the state attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the
citizen, due process comes into play." Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437.
43. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
44. Id. at 569.
45. Id. at 573.
46. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
47. Id. at 567.
48. Id. at 575.
[Vol. 53
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tion under the due process clause.49 Accordingly, the Court held the students
could not be dismissed without some measure of due process. 50
One thing is clear, the private individual's reputation has been a highly
valued commodity. In both its interpretation of the common law of defamation
and in its recognition of a liberty interest under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, the Supreme Court has recognized and affirmed the legitimate
and strong interest an individual has in his reputation. The rise of the media in
the 20th century forced the Supreme Court to balance the individual's right to
his good name against the media's right to free speech and press. The Court's
decisions in New York Times and Gertz held that an individual could no
longer recover for a defamatory falsehood absent some showing of fault on the
part of the publisher in investigating the statement's truth. In reaching this
result, the Court was striving to achieve a balance between these two strong
competing interests. This Note will now turn to the realities of defamation
litigation to determine the actual balance that had been struck prior to Hepps.
Assuming that the Supreme Court's goal was to achieve a balance be-
tween the private figure's right to his good name and the media's right to
publish freely, it may have fallen short of that goal. While empirical evidence
on the realities of defamation litigation is scarce, two recent empirical studies
authored by Professor Marc A. Franklin (hereinafter Franklin I & Franklin
II) help formulate a conclusion as to the actual balance achieved between
these two important interests.51 The most striking statistic outlined in Franklin
II reveals that a defamation plaintiff has approximately a five-percent chance
of final victory on his claim.52 A breakdown of the study into the various pro-
cedural stages of the average defamation claim will highlight the ramifications
of this raw statistic. A great majority of the defamation plaintiffs lost before
their claim ever reached trial. Of the appellate cases chronicled in the study,
49. Id. at 577.
50. The students were suspended as a result of a period of general unrest among
the student body. Each student received a ten day suspension. Id. at 570. None of the
students, however, were given a hearing to determine the operative facts of the suspen-
sions. The Court determined that the students had a liberty interest in their reputations
that could be endangered because of the suspensions. Id. at 576. While the Court gave
the school board wide discretion in its choice of the pre-expulsion due process measures
to be put in place, it held that notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential when
one's reputation is concerned. Id. at 581.
51. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. R s. J. 455 [hereinafter Franklin I]; Franklin, Suing Media For Libel: A
Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. Rns. J. 797 [hereinafter Franklin II].
52. Franklin II, supra note 51, at 803. This was a study that encompassed all
types of defamation litigation, and as such the results are a mix of cases tried under the
Gertz and Sullivan standards of liability. It is a certainty that the recovery rates for
the Gertz private-figure plaintiffs are somewhat higher than the corresponding rates for
the Sullivan public-figure plaintiffs simply because the Gertz plaintiffs usually have a
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seventy-five percent involved rulings by the trial court at the pre-trial stage. 53
If the trial court ruled in favor of the defamation plaintiff on a pre-trial mo-
tion, the ruling stood a fifty-percent chance of reversal on appeal." However,
if the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant's pre-trial motion, it was up-
held on appeal seventy-five percent of the time.55 This translated into final
victory for the media-defendant at the pre-trial stage in 104 of the 190 cases
reported. 56 If the defamation plaintiff reached trial, his chances of success in-
creased. Of the thirty-seven trial verdicts reported, plaintiffs obtained ten ver-
dicts which were ultimately upheld on appeal, as compared to twenty-two for
the media-defendants (four cases had yet to be disposed of at the time of the
study). 57 Although plaintiffs fared well in front of juries, their verdicts were
upheld less than fifty-percent of the time.58 To the contrary, if the defendant
received a favorable jury verdict, it was upheld in thirteen of the fifteen re-
ported cases. 59
A possible explanation for the disparity in the success rates of the two
competing interests is that the media-defendants are simply not printing false
defamatory statements about individuals, and accordingly, these plaintiffs are
correctly denied a verdict in their favor. However, this conclusion is not sup-
ported by the data. Of the eighty-three successful defense verdicts in media
defendant cases reported in Franklin I, only five successfully raised the defense
of "truth."6 0 The remainder of the defenses raised were comprised of various
common law defenses (fifty-one percent) and the constitutional defenses out-
lined in Gertz and New York Times (thirty-seven percent).6 ' Several conclu-
sions may be drawn from the data outlined in Franklin I & II. First, suing for
defamation is not likely to be a successful venture.62 The plaintiff suing for
53. Id. at 829.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The statistics break down as follows: The media defendant won 32 out of
50 motions to dismiss, for a 64 percent success rate. The media defendant won 72 of 77
motions for summary judgment, for a total of 94 percent. Id. at 803.
57. Id. at 829.
58. Id.
59. While the plaintiffs that succeeded at trial were rewarded with damage
awards, the majority were reversed or remitted. Of the ten successful plaintiff awards,
five were upheld and five were altered. Id. at 805. The five that were upheld were: (1)
$20,000 general and punitive; (2) $50,000 general; (3) $60,000 general; (4) $10,000
general; (5) $350,000 general. The five that were altered were: (1) $75,000 reduced to
$45,000; (2) $88,000 reduced to $75,000; (3) $132,500 reduced to $32,500; (4)
$17,550 reduced to $15,000; (5) $36,000 for four claims. Id. at 805 & n.21.
60. Franklin I, supra note 51, at 493.
61. Id.
62. See Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Defamation Litigation: Setting
the Record Straight, 71 IowA L. REv. 226 (1985). Bezanson feels that the libel plain-
tiff sues for the correction of the falsehood and that ultimate judicial victory is not
essential. Id. at 228. Defamation plaintiffs feel that the act of initiating the suit is
effectively showing their disagreement with the statements that defamed them. Id. Fur-
thermore, Bezanson submits that the media's disdain for the plaintiff often leads to
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defamation stands a five percent chance of ultimate victory. 3 Second, these
victories are determined by whether the plaintiff can overcome the culpability
standards of Gertz and New York Times, not because the statements at issue
are true or nondefamatory in nature.6 Indeed, it can be argued that Gertz and
New York Times have provided the media with a substantial shield from lia-
bility in publishing defamatory statements, even though this shield must often
be erected in the context of costly litigation. In any event, in light of the cur-
rent state of defamation litigation, any further burdening of the defamation
plaintiff and his desire to protect his good name from defamatory falsehoods
should be permitted only for compelling reasons.
It is against this background that Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps65 can best be evaluated. The litigation in Hepps centered on articles
written about Maurice S. Hepps in the Philadelphia Enquirer.66 Maurice S.
Hepps was the principal stockholder of General Programming, Inc. (GPI), a
corporation that franchised a chain of stores known as "Thrifty" stores.67 Be-
tween May 1975, and May 1976, the Philadelphia Enquirer published a series
of articles alleging that Hepps had links to organized crime, and that he had
used those links to influence the State Liquor Control Board in its rulings
regarding liquor sales to the Thrifty stores.68 Furthermore, the articles told of
a Grand Jury investigation into Hepps' alleged links to organized crime and
his attempts to influence the Liquor Control Board.6
Hepps brought suit against the Enquirer in Pennsylvania state court, al-
leging that the articles had defamed him.7 0 In Pennsylvania, as was true in
many states, there existed a common law presumption that a person's reputa-
tion was a good one.7 1 Accordingly, a defamatory statement was presumed
animosity and causes emotion to play a role in the lawsuit. This results in the plaintiff
pursuing a suit where logic and reason might instruct the plaintiff to drop the suit. Id.
at 229.
63. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a
Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 5 (1983). The study cited by Franklin shows a general
recovery rate for tort plaintiffs of 52 to 59 percent, as compared to the 10 percent rate
for the defamation plaintiffs. Id. at 4 n.18.
64. See Franklin 1, supra note 51, at 494.
65. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
66. Id. at 769.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. "The articles discussed a state legislator, described as 'a Pittsburgh Dem-
ocrat and convicted felon' whose actions displayed a clear pattern of interference in
state government by [the legislator] on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty." Id. The articles
went on to report that "investigators have found connections between Thrifty and un-
derworld figures" and that "the Thrifty beverage beer chain ... had connections ...
with organized crime." Id.
70. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1134 (1986).
71. Id. at 312, 485 A.2d at 378.
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false.7 2 If the plaintiff could sustain the burden of proof as to the other prima
facie elements of defamation, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the
truth of the statement.7 8 If the defendant proved the truth of the statement, it
was an absolute defense to the claim of defamation.7 4 It was this presumption
of falsity that formed the gravamen of the Hepps decision.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court concluded that the presump-
tion of falsity was in contravention of the first amendment.75 Accordingly, the
trial court instructed the jury that Hepps, in addition to the other elements of
his defamation claim, also had to sustain the burden of proving that the de-
famatory statements were false.76 The jury found for the Enquirer, and pursu-
ant to Pennsylvania statute," Hepps appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Gertz simply required
Hepps to prove the fault of the Enquirer in publishing the challenged arti-
cles."8 As to the falsity of the articles, the court found that the presumption of
falsity did not unconstitutionally inhibit free speech.7 1 Accordingly, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial with instructions
that the presumption of falsity would stand.80 The United States Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.81
The United States Supreme Court found that the Constitution requires
that a private figure plaintiff defamed by a media defendant's statements on a
matter of public concern must prove both the falsity of the statement and the
fault of the publisher. 2 The Court's primary concern in Hepps centered on the
"chilling effect" that the burden of proving the truth of a statement would
have on the media's decision whether to publish statements.8 3 The Court was
concerned that a publisher would not publish certain articles due to the pub-
lishers's fear of unjustified litigation." The Court reasoned that this situation
becomes particularly intolerable in situations where the statements at issue are
72. Id. at 313, 485 A.2d at 379.
73. Id. at 313-14, 485 A.2d at 378-79.
74. See id. at 313-14, 485 A.2d at 379; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
8343(b)(1) (1982) (defendant has the burden of proving the truth of a defamatory
statement); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (common-law
presumes injury to reputation from publication of a defamatory statement).
75. Hepps, 506 Pa. at 311, 485 A.2d at 377.
76. Id.
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722(7) (1982).
78. Hepps, 506 Pa. at 319, 485 A.2d at 384.
79. Id. at 327, 485 A.2d at 387.
80. Id. at 318, 329, 485 A.2d at 382-87.
81. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 472 U.S. 1025 (1985).
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of public concern, a situation analogous to the Hepps factual setting.85 Ac-
cordingly, because the first amendment was designed to protect such speech
from interference, the Court struck down the presumption of falsity of a de-
famatory statement.86
The Court justified its decision to place the burden of proof as to falsity
on Hepps by relying on its decisions concerning state sponsored censorship of
speech.87 In these decisions, the Court held that before the state can restrict
speech protected by the first amendment it must "bear the burden" of showing
the restriction is justified.88 The basic proposition underlying these decisions
was the need to encourage free debate and the dissemination of information to
the public.89 Only by requiring the government to show justification for its
restrictions could the Court be satisfied that these goals were obtained.90
In Hepps, the Court analogized the government's attempts to restrict
speech to the private figure's attempt to redress the injury to his reputation
through a suit in defamation.91 The Court found that the underlying need to
encourage debate on public issues, found to be compelling in the governmental
restriction cases, was also present in a private suit for defamation.2 Accord-
85. The Court stated:
"Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant," was found wanting because it did not "mean that only false
speech [would] be deterred" - doubts regarding whether truth "can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so" would force good
faith critics of official conduct to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.'"
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958))).
86. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776-77.
87. Id. The four cases cited dealt basically with unjustified governmental restric-
tion of free speech. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980), the Court invalidated a state public utility commission order which prohibited
a utility from inserting in monthly bills various pamphlets advocating nuclear power. In
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court held that
states cannot prohibit corporations from spending money to express their views on ref-
erendum issues, even if they do not deal directly with their business. In Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court held that a state cannot require the signing of
a loyalty oath before a taxpayer can receive a benefit. The basic theme of these cases is
that when speech protected by the first amendment is at issue, the government cannot
limit that speech without justification.
88. Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 535; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786;
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525-26.
89. See Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 534; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77.
90. See Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 540-43; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787-
88; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528-29.
91. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
92. "[T]he need to encourage debate on public issues that concerned the Court
in the governmental-restriction cases is of concern in a similar manner in this
case .... ." Id. Furthermore, "the first amendment requires that we protect some false-
hood in order to protect speech that matters. Here the speech concerns the legitimacy
of the political process, and therefore clearly 'matters.'" Id. at 778 (quoting New York
13
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ingly, the private figure defamation plaintiff must now "bear the burden" of
showing his restriction on the media's right to speak is justified - he must
prove that the defamatory statement at issue is false.
However, several elements of the Hepps Court's argument appear incon-
sistent with its previous cases concerning defamation. The Court is undoubt-
edly correct in its assessment of the burden that the government must shoulder
before it can restrict speech entitled to first amendment protection. However,
the problem arises in the Court's analogy between the burden applicable to the
government and the similar burden it places on the private figure plaintiff.
This analogy is appropriate only if the private figure's peculiar characteristics
are ignored, i.e. equating the private individual with the public official or the
public figure. This position appears inconsistent with the Court's previous deci-
sions holding that the private figure's burden must be calculated with an eye
to his peculiar characteristics. 93 The Court in Gertz, after reaffirming the New
York Times test for public figures and public officials stated, "the communica-
tions media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and pub-
lic figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehoods concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to a private individual." 94 Furthermore, the Court stated that the indi-
vidual has "not accepted public office or assumed an 'influential role in order-
ing society' -9 and "has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection
of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." 98 By equating
the private figure to the government the Court has ignored the unique position
the private figure occupies in society.
The Hepps majority's effort to justify this inconsistency by focusing on
the type of speech involved also appears inconsistent with Gertz and its prog-
eny. While the Court does not expressly rely on the "general or public inter-
est" test of Rosenbloom,9" much of the Court's justification for the shift in the
burden of proof is centered on the nature of speech involved.9 8 This line of
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
93. The differences between the private figure and the public figure, and the rea-
sons for differing culpability standards were enunciated in Gertz. Basically, private
figures are more deserving of recovery, and hence are required to bear a lesser burden
of proof in their defamation claims, because they do not have the access to media
channels that the public figures do. Furthermore, the private figure has relinquished no
part of his good name by thrusting himself into the public eye. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323,
344-45 (1974); see supra note 26. Accordingly, these differences, as well as the strong
state interest in redressing injury to its private citizens, require that different rules
should exist for the private figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
95. Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (War-
ren, C.J., concurring in result)).
96. Id.
97. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
98. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986).
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reasoning (one which centers on the type of speech involved and not the type
of plaintiff involved) was found unacceptable in Gertz.99 In Gertz, the majority
found that a decision based on the "public or general interest in a statement
does injustice to the two competing interests at stake. 100 On the one hand, the
Court reasoned that a private figure that is defamed on a matter of public
concern has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous culpability standards
of New York Times."' This would be true despite the characteristics that dis-
tinguish the private and public plaintiffs. On the other hand, the Court rea-
soned that the publisher who defames a person on a matter of private concern
may be held liable even after they took every reasonable precaution to insure
reliability.10 2 Thus, it would appear that the Hepps majority's reliance on the
type of speech involved to justify the increased burden to the plaintiff is also
misplaced if its opinion is to remain consistent with Gertz.
Even if the majority's decision was correct in its reasoning, several addi-
tional factors which the majority opinion failed to mention seem to make the
decision unjustified and unnecessary. Hepps brings speech that has been previ-
ously discredited under the guise of first amendment protection without show-
ing adequate justification. As Hepps centers on a presumption of law, the deci-
sion will only affect that category of defamatory speech which is not provable
as either true or false. Indeed, if the statements at issue were provable as
either true or false, evidence would be available to either rebut the presump-
tion or render it unnecessary. It is inevitable that some instances of such
speech will be false, and thus, Hepps will now protect some defamatory false-
hoods. Therefore, a plaintiff who can show that the defendant published a de-
famatory statement with negligence or reckless disregard as to its truth but
cannot prove the falsity of the statement will lose even though he was the
subject of a defamatory falsehood. This result is questionable in light of the
fact that the defamatory utterance has rarely been afforded constitutional pro-
tection under the first amendment.10 3
99. The Court in Gertz laid waste to the idea that simply because speech is of
public concern the plaintiff's status is irrelevant. "The extension of the New York
Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state
interest [in the reputations of the state's citizens] to a degree we find unacceptable."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346; see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976)
(refusing to reinstate the Rosenbloom "public interest" test).
100. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The court outlined its distaste for the defamatory falsehood in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973), stating: "But there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public is-
sues." Id. at 340.
The Court has placed the defamatory falsehood in that category of speech which
"[a]re no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
19881
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The Court justifies protecting defamatory falsehoods because it now pro-
tects the true statement that was also unprovable. The problem is that the
majority's decision adds little, if anything, to the previous protection of Gertz
and New York Times. Because the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
action at least constituted negligence before he can recover, the careful and
prudent publisher in theory cannot be liable. The previous presumption of fal-
sity only hurt the negligent or malicious publisher who could not prove the
defamatory statement true. Extending this reasoning, the Court's decision will
only help negligent and malicious publishers, a holding of dubious credibility.
As the minority in Hepps stated, "While the public's interest in an uninhibited
press is at its nadir when the publisher is at fault or worse, society's 'equally
compelling' need for judicial redress of libellous utterances is at its zenith."' "
Furthermore, the Court has ignored the important policy considerations
behind the presumption of falsity. A private individual who has been defamed
deserves the presumption of falsity for several reasons. First, the common law
presumption of falsity is consistent with the strong interest society recognizes
in a person's reputation, an interest that has been recognized from the incep-
tion of our nation as legitimate and deserving of protection.10 5
Second, of the two parties to the litigation, the private individual is the
least able to present proof of a statement's veracity.106 The media defendant
has access to sources, -names and information that was gathered in the prepa-
ration of the story. 10 7 Furthermore, many jurisdictions have enacted "shield
law legislation" which could be invoked to prevent the plaintiff from gaining
access to information altogether.108 The presumption of falsity helped bring to
light the relevant facts surrounding the defamatory statements because the
defendant would have to divulge such facts to overcome the presumption. 0
Third, when the media publishes a statement, it is in effect vouching for
its substance. The plaintiff, in a defamation action, is challenging the truth of
the statement. Requiring the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement is in
contravention to the general rule that the party making an accusation must
provide proof of that accusation.110 The presumption of falsity merely forced
the party making the statements to support them.
Finally, the presumption of the truth of a statement forces a plaintiff to
340 (1973) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
104. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 784-85 (1986) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
105. Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Freedom of The Press -
Libel and Slander - Burden of Proof - As A Matter of Federal First Amendment
Law, A Private Plaintiff Has The Burden of Proving the Falsity of An Alleged Defam-
atory Statement, 50 CINc. L. REv. 807, 818 n.70 (1981) [hereinafter Constitutional
Law].
106. Id. at 818.
107. Id.
108. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779.
109. Constitutional Law, supra note 105, at 818.
110. Constitutional Law, supra note 105, at 819.
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prove a negative.11' For example, assume a publication accuses an individual
of sexual misconduct. To recover in defamation, the plaintiff is forced to prove
that he did not commit the misconduct. Contrary to the presumption of inno-
cence that governs in a criminal trial, a presumption of bad character will
govern in a trial for defamation."'
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps"3 is incorrect for several reasons. First, studies show that
the Court's prior decisions provided more than adequate protection for the
media defendant. Second, the Court has ignored the strong, legitimate interest
private figures have in their reputations by equating them with the public offi-
cial in justifying the shift of the burden of proof. Further, the Court has
shielded some defamatory falsehoods from prosecution in exchange for a mar-
ginal increase in the protection of an already adequately protected media de-
fendant. Finally, the Court has ignored the strong public policy issues sur-
rounding the presumption of falsity. In short, "[t]he Court's decision trades on
the good names of private individuals with little First Amendment coin to
show for it."" 4
PHILLIP G. GREENFIELD
111. Constitutional Law, supra note 105, at 818.
112. Constitutional Law, supra note 105, at 818.
113. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
114. Id. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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